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MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION: 
LEARNING TO DEAL WITH 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES 
Andrew S. Watson* 
It has become cliche to note that most attorneys spend a high 
percentage of their working time in mediation and negotiation 
activities. Their success in these relatively informal dispute reso-
lution procedures enables the legal machinery to operate as 
smoothly as it does. Although the ability to "think like a law-
yer," the central focus of contemporary legal education, per-
vades mediation and negotiation activities, additional skills are 
essential for success in these "alternatives to litigation," as they 
are now called in law-school circles. The additional skills are the 
psychological skills involved in all interpersonal processes. Profi-
cient practitioners recognize that failure to understand their na-
ture and to handle these processes effectively creates the risk of 
incapacitation. 
While some rare individuals possess a seemingly inborn 
knowledge of interpersonal skills, the rest of us must be taught. 
Yet, most law schools teach very little about the complex psy-
chological interchanges between human beings when they are 
negotiating or mediating a dispute. Even as the ability to think 
like a lawyer is being carefully honed, little is done to develop 
the ability to cope with the inevitably conflicting feelings that 
parallel lawyers' thoughts as they confront the stresses of negoti-
ation and mediation. Additionally, the personality traits of many 
people who elect to study law militate against the development 
of skills for coping with these psychological and emotional mat-
ters. 1 In this essay I analyze some of the emotional events that 
occur during mediation and negotiation; the analysis may help 
us understand many of the problems that arise during the devel-
opment and application of these legal practice skills. Following 
the analysis I present a few suggestions about how this teaching 
might best be accomplished. 
* Professor of Law, Professor of Psychiatry (Ret.), University of Michigan. B.S., 
1942, University of Michigan; M.D., 1950, M.S. in Med., 1954, Temple University. 
1. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal 
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 93, 98-106 (1968). 
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I. LAWYER As MEDIATOR-ROLE CoNFLICTS 
The role of mediator requires certain kinds of behavior that 
differ from behaviors required in other lawyer roles, such as trial 
advocate. "A mediator helps disputants toward resolving their 
disagreement. Unlike a judge or arbitrator, however, the media-
tor lacks authority to impose a decision on the parties: he can 
only facilitate the process."2 The mediator stands between the 
parties, asserting no position of his own but, rather, drawing 
from them a solution that the parties and others perceive as fair 
and equitable. This vision of the role of mediator immediately 
conjures up an image of passivity. Clearly this is a relative term; 
a totally passive mediator would be worthless. A mediator's 
function, however, does involve passivity when compared with a 
negotiator's active pressing of his party's interest. 
This relative passivity stirs a variety of responses in lawyers 
and sometimes generates problems associated with the negotia-
tion process. To some, the mere suggestion of behaving passively 
is anathematic. They link such behavior, consciously or uncon-
sciously, with images and issues of masculinity, power, weakness. 
When they occur ;it a conscious level, these images may create 
problems for attorneys and students. Unfortunately (or fortu-
nately?), they can also tap archaic elements of psychological ex-
perience and thereby work their effects through the mechanisms 
and apparatus of the inner mind (the unconscious), where they 
are not subject to the rules of rational, cognitive thinking. An 
encounter with these psychological forces, either in oneself or 
one's opponent, instantly poses operational problems of great 
moment, which, if not resolved, may totally thwart the mission 
of a mediator. This is why self-knowledge is so vitally important. 
Tilting with real opponents challenges an attorney, but mobiliz-
ing antagonism and resistance from unconscious ghosts wastes 
energy and, in lawyers' operational terms, misuses "billable 
hours." The role of mediator may require a lawyer to surrender 
a substantial amount of the psychological control he exercises in 
other legal activities and to adopt a position that may threaten 
some of his psychological attitudes if he does not understand 
them and see them in clear perspective. This threat could cause 
problems separate from the substantive questions being 
mediated. 
2. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982). 
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This description of unconscious attitudes toward the media-
tor's role may appear to contain a traditional male, "sexist" bias. 
To the extent that the bias exists, women's traditional acultura-
tion may, at this time in history, make them more effective as 
"passive" mediators. Now that we have begun to break through 
these sexist stereotypes, both men and women may develop a 
new layer of conflict superimposed upon the old; whatever their 
own past images of male-female passivity, they may now have to 
"be sure" they do not behave in a sexist way vis-a-vis passivity. 
As individuals struggle with this double layer of concern for 
roles, it may lead to the loss of all spontaneity for awhile, but 
that is one of the costs of change. 
In the mediation process, both parties to the mediation be-
come the mediator's clients. It is his task to insure development 
of an equitable compromise. The higher visibility of mediation 
as a method of resolution of disagreements may require, for the 
system to remain viable, that mediation results appear equita-
ble. 3 The mandate that the outcome be fair to each side may 
require counsel to prevent some clients from conceding too 
much. While this position may be consistent with an attorney's 
encouragement in the face of a client's hesitance to press a dis-
pute, it is contrary to an attorney's more usual focus of capitaliz-
ing on an opponent's willingness to concede. 
Because the mediator is privy to all of the data for all parties, 
mediation, more than other lawyer transactions, may activate 
strong identifications with and reactions to issues and parties. 
Although these reactions may be strongly conscious or deeply re-
pressed, a conscientious mediator would not ignore them, once 
they entered awareness. In fact, great effort should be made to 
apprehend and clarify any cues about their existence so that de-
cisions about their management can be made on rational 
grounds and not in unconscious, defensive ways that further re-
move them from cognitive control. When obscured, these reac-
tions are "acted out," expressed in behavior that is justified by a 
rationalized explanation that camouflages the unconscious reac-
tion from the actor's awareness.• Teaching about mediation, 
3. See generally id. For a further elaboration of concepts of fairness in mediation, see 
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 AR1z. L. REV. 
329 (1984). 
4. This has happened often enough in the history of the world's judicial as well as 
political affairs. For example, Hirsch has identified some blind spots in Justice Frank-
furter's analyses. See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FEL1x FRANKFURTER (1981). I agree 
with Hirsch's analyses and add a few analyses of my own. See Watson, Book Review, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 742 (1982). See also J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, ch. IV (1936); 
J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971). 
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then, should involve exploration of the psychological nature of 
this identification process. Efforts should be made to illuminate 
this process, to emphasize its normality, and to improve under-
standing of how the process weaves its way into operational im-
portance in all decision-making by attorneys. 
A few comments about the meaning of role are appropriate. 
This sociologist's term describes the complex collection of expec-
tations that society imposes upon an individual's performance. 5 
For example, lawyers are expected to be "counselors." They may 
hope to limit their work strictly to issues of law but inevitably 
clients will drag in matters involving their lives and their emo-
tional problems. Lawyers, if they wish to relate effectively with 
their clients, will have to deal with these matters. It is my per-
sonal observation that most lawyers who achieve reputations for 
effectiveness with clients have a knack for handling their clients' 
psychological problems. These lawyers know how to listen and 
how to make the client know that they have listened. It is sur-
prising how many lawyers fail in this fundamental and central 
element of a lawyer's work. I would surmise that any lawyer who 
can't make his clients feel well listened to will have to perform 
with prodigious skill in the technical aspects of law in order to 
succeed in practice. 
II. LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR-PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSIONS 
During the years I have taught negotiation, I have noted with 
intrigue the various psychological conflicts that the process mo-
bilizes in students as well as practitioners. Some of these con-
flicts wax and wane as values shift over time; they also appear to 
gain substantial support from the intellectual and social "fads" 
of the day. For example, during the 1970's, awareness that the 
negotiator uses "power" in his operations often engendered con-
siderable conflict in law students and lawyers. Some individuals 
needed to blind themselves completely to long-range conse-
Such action is neither strange nor to be criticized, but rather is one of the places in the 
judicial process where training efforts should assist judges to deal with such forces in a 
different way, so that their decisions may be more rational, equitable, and just. For many 
years this author has been conducting judicial seminars on the stresses of decision-mak-
ing. One of the goals has been to help the judges feel and understand their own personal 
conflicts as they carry out their judicial roles. Most (but not all) of the participants seem 
to believe that they leave the experience better equipped to objectify their own subjec-
tive reactions to the many conflicts of their role. Their mastery is seemingly increased. 
5. For a discussion of society's expectations in the context of sex roles, see T. PAR-
SONS & R.F. BALES, FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS 22-26 (1955). 
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quences as they moved to destroy their opponent's position. 
Other individuals, taking an opposite approach, were reticent to 
utilize their legal strength, feeling that it was not appropriate or 
"nice" for them to "take advantage" of their opponents. These 
polar attitudes greatly influenced the degree to which individu-
als "wanted to win" and the effort they invested in the negotia-
tion; they als_o shaped the students' negotiating style. Both atti-
tudes mirrored current social concerns about the appropriate use 
of authority and power. The young, who had not yet resolved 
this difficult value conflict, sometimes "acted out" their conflict 
in negotiation activities.6 
A lawyer's view of the ethical duty to "zealously represent his 
client" will vary greatly according to the psychological conflicts 
the lawyer has about the negotiation process. This conflict has 
little to do with the content of the negotiation; rather, it relates 
to the internal, psychological process that negotiation activities 
trigger. To a very large degree this process is unconscious and 
"non-rational." While it can and will be influenced by experi-
ence, behavior which is largely controlled from these uncon-
scious wellsprings of action will remain totally beyond any kind 
of conscious and cognitive control unless the person learning has 
had a "guided experience." Guided experiences are discussed 
below. 
The process of negotiation is full · of vigorous interchanges, 
many of which are likely, sooner or later, to stimulate aggressive 
impulses. This elicitation of aggression is commonplace. An op-
ponent's aggressive response "legitimates" an aggressive reac-
tion. An opponent's passive response, on the other hand, may 
also stimulate aggressiveness; an activity-oriented attorney may 
have difficulty coping with inactivity. Aggression, a heavily con-
flicted emotion for many, is an emotion to which lawyers have a 
special sensitivity.7 The combination of a particular person's ca-
pacity to be passive with the negotiation process's requirement 
of extensive listening, can draw forth sufficient aggression to in-
sure that unconscious "defense mechanisms" emerge, preventihg 
rational responses to some of the important elements of the ne-
gotiation8 and precluding effectiveness. Although such aggressive 
behavior will be masked by various "explanations," the real rea-
son will be unexpressed concerns over hurting and being hurt. 
The result will be a stalemate. 
6. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
7. See Watson, supra note 1, at 101-03. 
8. See A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS, ch. IV (1978). 
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Attitudes towards "maleness" and "femaleness" will inevita-
bly emerge in the negotiation process, regardless of the gender of 
the participants. Each of us has deep, unconscious, images of 
what we must do to be male or female. We wish to behave in 
ways consistent with the image we seek to project and avoid ac-
tions resembling the behavior of the opposite gender. Because 
little human behavior is biologically gender-linked, humans may 
select from a broad range of available behaviors; these behaviors 
are, however, socially gender-linked. This discontinuity between 
a broader biological and a narrower social range of behaviors can 
be a source of great personal discomfort and, more importantly, 
highly complicated, individual defensive actions that interfere 
with the negotiation process. 
The question of whether any man can fully understand a wo-
man, or vice versa, has been discussed in recent years. 9 While 
limitations may always exist, if individuals cannot understand 
each other to some degree, there is little hope for the human 
race. Marriages (a form of ongoing negotiation) rely upon em-
pathetic understanding, although recent marriage-divorce statis-
tics cast a shadow on belief in cross-gender understanding.10 
In the last analysis, the psychological dynamics of the negotia-
tor are highly personal qualities. A skilled and thoughtful lawyer 
will "keep book" on his opponents and attempt to define and 
understand them in these psychological terms. Individual nego-
tiators' attributes are finite in number, and their constancy and 
continuity will enable counsel to use them to predict an oppo-
nent's tactics and strategies. Lawyers follow this practice, for ex-
ample, when they engage in "judge shopping." 
Experienced negotiators acknowledge the wisdom of one per-
son conducting the active discussion to keep the line of argu-
ment on track. One non-speaking team member can observe the 
non-verbal behaviors of the opponents and ponder their under-
lying implications. Often non-active members of a negotiating 
team broadcast vivid messages that powerfully communicate the 
team's intentions. When you discover a large stock of supplies 
behind one part of your opponent's lines, you may deduce that 
something important is scheduled to happen there. 
A negotiator must constantly address the ubiquitous question 
of veracity, his own and his opponent's. At first glance, deter-
9. For a good discussion of this whole issue, see J. WILLI, CouPLES IN COLLUSION 
(1982). Chapter I sets forth the general proposition. 
10. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see C. FooTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDERS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1073-78 (2nd ed. 1976). This contains statistical 
material exploring this complicated question. 
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mining what is a lie appears to be a simple task; it turns out to 
be a complicated matter about which much controversy exists in 
negotiation circles. It is my own impression that lawyers are in-
clined to over-diagnose lying and to include a variety of psycho-
logical distortions within its ambit; this makes lying a very diffi-
cult problem to which lawyers must respond. 11 It is probably 
best to reserve the term lie for those distortions made deliber-
ately to mislead. A good negotiator, after clarifying and narrow-
ing his definitions, should try to understand how he feels about 
lying. A powerful reaction to somebody else's lies suggests great 
concern over one's own honesty, and grappling with that kind of 
issue is always the first order of business in dealing with any 
psychological response. 12 In general, we are more frightened of 
our own impulses and feelings when we don't understand them. 
We handle impulses and feelings better when we know what 
they are and why we are afraid of them.13 We are then in a posi-
tion to test our real vulnerabilities and take concrete measures 
to protect ourselves. 14 
It behooves working professionals to ground all standards, in-
cluding those related to lying, on more rational bases than unex-
amined moral interdiction. Lying can be so advantageous super-
ficially that some basis should be established for not doing it. 
The obvious reason is that others' knowledge of one's lying leads 
to a loss of credibility which, for a working professional, can only 
have destructive results. I would like to suggest a second reason. 
Even if others do not learn about a lie, the negotiator who lies 
knows that the lie occurred and must then recognize that others 
may successfully lie to him. This induces a paranoid attitude, a 
psychological burden that can never be totally put aside. The 
long-term costs of lying imply a cost-benefit analysis supporting 
11. For a good analysis of the complexity of the concept of lying, see S. BoK, LYING: 
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978). 
12. In fact, as a rule of thumb, all powerful responses to somebody else's behavior 
should send one running to a mirror for some self-evaluation. Any emotion which is so 
strong as to be beyond logical expectations probably reflects a personal identification 
with the trait. In other words, "I am afraid or critical of my own impulses to lie so I must 
stamp out all lying, hoping I may thus control my own." The trouble is that, because 
there is no conscious awareness of the desire to lie, there can be no conscious efforts to 
forestall the impulse. 
13. See Hendin & Haas, Combat Adaptations of Vietnam Veterans Without Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorders, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 956 (1984). 
14. This is the vital psychological skill known to analytically oriented therapists as 
reality testing. See A. WATSON, supra note 8, at 80-81. For this substantive reference and 
others below, about psychiatric theory, I shall refer to my own textbook in the belief that 
it is a good starting point for the average legal reader. The text abounds with other 
references for those who wish to go more deeply into the subject. 
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the old admonition to do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you. 
For those who deal with others, self-knowledge is a prerequi-
site to the development of self-objectivity and a sense of per-
sonal security. The principle has long been recognized. "This 
above all: to thine own self be true, and it must follow, as the 
night the day, thou can't not then be false to any man."111 Per-
haps the highest acknowledgment of that concept occurs, in 
modern times, in the training of psychoanalysts. The trainee 
must substantially understand himself before he is permitted to 
turn his attention to others.16 This training requirement entails 
a personal psychoanalysis lasting three to five years, and some-
times more, exploring all areas of the trainee's unconscious, al-
lowing what had previously been unconscious to become con-
scious and under the cognitive control of the mind, thereby 
removing or greatly diminishing the need for psychological de-
f enses.17 This expensive learning process is impractical for most 
professions. Less extensive and less costly processes that pro-
mote insight and self-learning might be utilized in legal educa-
tion. It is my contention that such awareness would greatly im-
prove professional efficiency, enhance creativity, lessen 
professional stress, and facilitate more proficient interpersonal 
relationships among lawyers and between lawyers and their cli-
ents. This kind of learning can be incorporated into conven-
tional law school teaching18 and into negotiation and mediation 
training. 
Negotiators will profit from knowledge •Of their own 
prejudices. I do not even argue about whether prejudices exist; I 
acknowledge that debate occurs about the extent and nature of 
prejudices. Erikson19 notes that any well-reared child knows that 
everything that he learns in his own environment is Good/Right/ 
Nice and everything outside his own surroundings is Bad/Evil/ 
Not Nice. Everyone carries these values out of childhood into 
adolescence, when a wider sociability diminishes prejudgment as 
individuals learn to question their own archaic presumptions. 
Bluntly stated, prejudices exist. Although they may assume myr-
iad subtle forms shaped by culture and family idiosyncrasies, all 
15. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I., scene iii., lines 78-80. 
16. For a brief description of psychoanalytic training, see F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 20-21 (1966). 
17. A. WATSON, supra note 8, chs. Ill, IV. 
18. See Watson, supra note 1, at 150-63. 
19. E. ERIKSON, TOYS AND REASONS: STAGES IN THE RITUALIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 75-
84 (1977). . 
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prejudices stand as "Truths." The important question is 
whether they have been reevaluated, understood, and reinte-
grated in the thinking and decision-making of the adult 
individual. 
Ill. TRANSFERENCE PATTERNS 
Another important organizing principle, transference, and its 
counterpart in the observer, countertransference, assist psychia-
trists in understanding human behavior.20 Transference and 
countertransference are patterned b.ehaviors that are substan-
tially predictive of an individual's response to the multitude of 
stimuli from the external world. A transference response to a 
person is defined as 
[T]he fusion of unreal attributes which the observer be-
lieves to be present in the observed, with those which are 
in fact present. The unreal attributes consist of "projec-
tions," which derive from some superficial likeness to an 
important person from the past such as a parent. The ob-
server then treats the new person as if they were the 
original model. The part qualities are seen as the whole.21 
Among the several definitions of transference, this one is some-
what controversial but, I believe, the most useful because it 
identifies and points the way for the intellectual procedures nec-
essary to use the definition effectively. 22 
These transference patterns reveal individual attitudes and 
feelings. They also may lead individuals to stereotype the ob-
served behavior of others. Information about transference pat-
terns can be elicited in some types of interviews. This informa-
tion in turn allows conclusions to be drawn about individuals' 
behaviors. 
The learned behavior that psychiatrists call character is adap-
tive in nature and relates to transference. 23 This psychological 
20. A. WATSON, supra note 8, at 2-8. 
21. Id. at 3. 
22. For a further contemporary description using this approach, see Gill & Hoffman, 
A Method for Studying the Analysis of Aspects of the Patient's Experience of the Rela-
tionship in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, 30 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC Assoc. 137, 
138-43 (1982). 
23. See A WATSON, supra note 8, at 304-09. For perhaps the best and most compre-
hensive discussion of this interesting subject, see W. REICH, CHARACTER ANALYSIS, ch. IV 
(1949). This classical work was first published in book form in 1933; parts of it appeared 
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rather than moral character constitutes the complex set of be-
haviors by means of which a person is recognized. It consists of 
the automated, adaptational response patterns allowed by the 
individual's culture and adopted by the individual, even though 
they may sometimes cause distress in others. Some response pat-
terns express compromise behaviors. For example, a brash, as-
sertive, humorous speech pattern may allow an individual to ex-
press thinly disguised aggression. The same things said "with a 
straight face" would enmesh a person in deep social difficulty 
but said in "jest," the comments are acceptable-they are in 
character. 24 
In accord with the proposition to know thyself, a lawyer 
should be aware of how her/his character looks and feels to 
others. "What do they encounter when they deal with me?" 
While a lawyer can do little to change this character, the indi-
vidual can, like a good poker player, cut losses or bet good cards 
aggressively. This accords with the admonition to avoid a losing 
battle or, if you must fight, to lose as cheaply as possible.211 
Know your character assets and use them skillfully, even as you 
avoid the kinds of encounters with which you have difficulty. Let 
your partner handle those. 
Similarly, your opponent's character qualities must be as-
sayed. If he is a blustery, macho type, it will not do to collide 
with him and stimulate his fulminating masculine assertiveness. 
What might he do with a "soft," "yielding," non-aggressive per-
son? Will he quiet down? It's worth an experiment, because 
jousting requires two parties. Such a pairing may force the nego-
tiation into a more rational channel, allowing progress to occur. 
How may a lawyer handle his opponent's character? First, 
learn to "diagnose" his behavior. One requisite assumption is 
that the observed character traits are purposeful. To determine 
the purpose one must, to use Reik's felicitous expression, "listen 
with the third ear."26 For example: "Why does my opponent ver-
bally beat upon me in such a way that I become angry and resis-
tive to everything he says or does? Does my opponent have some 
need to fail at this procedure by alienating me? Does he hope to 
make me angry and irrational?" Or: "Why do all of my oppo-
nent's comments always sound as if they are subtly granting me 
as papers six years earlier. 
24. For a literary example, see 0. WISTER, THE VIRGINIAN 30 (1902) ("When you call 
me that, smile."). 
25. See 3 C. VoN CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 243-44 (1956). 
26. T. REIK, LISTENING WITH THE THIRD EAR: THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF A PSYCHOANA-
LYST (1948). 
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permission for my moves? Do they need to feel always in control 
to be comfortable?" 
I have been noting character-based behaviors of which the ac-
tor may have been completely oblivious and therefore unaware 
of the problems the behaviors caused in the negotiation setting. 
Sometimes the knowledge that such behaviors occur without 
malice, i.e., without "mens rea," helps one to cope with an un-
pleasant encounter. In some situations, knowledge is power. 
IV. TEACHING SUGGESTIONS 
Mediation and negotiation courses offer a special opportunity 
to teach law students about the non-rational, emotional reac-
tions that have been described.27 Unexamined, these feelings re-
sult in an accretion of defensive self-protection that tends to in-
sulate an attorney from the crucial psychological facts of the 
process in which he is engaged. This insures an insensitive coun-
sel who cannot engage his client "where he is at" but may im-
pose counsel's prejudices upon the client. to meet the attorney's 
emotional requirements. 
These emotional reactions, ubiquitous in the activities in 
which lawyers are involved, can only be understood in the con-
text of a "guided experience." How can this be done? The class 
or seminar should include a person who is skillful at turning the 
discussion toward the interaction stimulated by the problems of 
the negotiation or mediation. In these practice settings the feel-
ings are live and real. Their exploration and analysis will gener-
ate in the negotiator insights about himself. He may then be 
able to generalize that self-awareness to other, similar lawyering 
experiences. For example, the negotiator who blinded himself to 
the long-range consequences of over-success could learn to rec-
ognize, understand, and evaluate the consequences of such activ-
ity and then learn to control his behavior. He will initially expe-
rience considerable discomfort when his behavior, forbidden by 
his value system, is brought to his attention. He should learn to 
recognize and to deal with his discomfort. Then he can deliber-
ately chose the amount of assertiveness he wishes to display, 
based on the goals of the activity. Behavior could become ra-
tional, not remain irrational. 
27. For a parallel discussion of methods for teaching students to recognize and han-
dle emotional conflicts in clinical settings, see Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A 
Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 248 (1975). 
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A "conventional" law professor working with a psychologically 
trained teacher for a semester or two will be able to assist stu-
dents to recognize their emotional responses. Over the years, 
quite a few of my colleagues have acquired the knowledge to 
work with students in analyzing their reactions. Eventually my 
presence serves mainly through the "magic" of my expertise, 
since my colleague also is able to make most of the necessary 
interpretive comments. 
Student mediations and negotiations can be video-taped and 
reviewed by those who are expert in reading body language and 
the psychological communication process. 28 Rather than being 
analyzed as failures of preparation or logic, the distortions and 
ineptitudes that occur may be seen for what they usually are, 
difficulties with some personal, psychological issue that arises in 
the encounter. The student tapes can be compared with real or 
simulated mediations and negotiations conducted by experts. 
The central teaching emphasis remains the psychological inter-
action process with its multiple dynamics of personal indentifi-
cation. This part of the process of learning lawyering skills is 
presently left largely to chance. 29 
Legal education in general, and the negotiation process in par-
ticular, exaggerate the common human problem regarding the 
amount of ambiguity that a person can tolerate. The enduring 
quest for certainty lurks behind the negotiation process; this can 
and should become a specific focus for exploration in teaching 
about negotiation. Individuals vary in the length of time that 
they can endure ambiguity about one or multiple issues. A skill-
ful negotiator must be able to tolerate such ambiguity for pro-
longed periods. In addition to understanding their own tolerance 
for ambiguity, lawyers should be able to recognize the ways they 
respond to others' needs for finality or non-ambiguity. For ex-
ample, some clients will be so incapable of handling this source 
of anxiety that, without a great deal of special attention, they 
simply cannot cope with extended negotiations; they will clamor 
for quick settlement of any negotiation in which they are in-
volved. Some co-counsel will have similar needs for certainty 
and will constantly press for closure, not on the merits of the 
issues but because of their own emotional discomfort with ambi-
guity. Each opponent will fall someplace along the spectrum of 
28. For a general discussion of body language, see A. ScHEFLEN, BODY LANGUAGE AND 
SOCIAL ORDER (1972). This book contains many photographic illustrations. 
29. This subject may be explored in the same contexts as interview dynamics. See A 
WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELLING PROCESS (1976). 
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ambiguity-toleration capacity. While a lawyer-may not ethically 
prolong procedures merely to harass, he should be highly sensi-
tive to how the negotiation process impinges upon his oppo-
nent's emotions and behavior. Finally, judges, mediators, and 
other officials involved in these dispute-resolution mechanisms 
also have their respective tolerance levels. These levels will be 
visible, and comprehensible, in the methods the individuals use 
to make their decisions. Observing their behavior closely may 
enable counsel to better predict the decision makers' timing as 
well as their decisions on procedure and substance. 
CONCLUSION 
These psychological processes are just a few of those that rou-
tinely appear in the mediation and negotiation activities which 
lawyers perform. They have substantial relevance to the training 
processes used to teach and learn about negotiation and media-
tion. Exposed to teaching activities focusing on these psychologi-
cal processes, students will experience some anxiety but, in the 
end, will be gratified by the increased psychological mastery 
they acquire. No human endeavor satisfies more than the acqui-
sition of mastery of the self. Students recognize that they have 
many unanswered questions about the practice of law and they 
try to grapple with those questions as soon as possible. Their 
rush to summer jobs in law offices is probably related to that 
concern. They might also be more eager to plunge into the sub-
stance and process of the second and third law school years if 
they foresaw more learning about practice problems in those 
classes. 
This is not to suggest that the intellectual learning that now 
occurs in the law school should be withdrawn. Rather, I am sug-
gesting that another parameter should be added to the teaching 
and learning about the professional skills involved in practicing 
law. Skills training in negotiation and mediation provides ideal 
opportunities to approach explicitly several emotionally charged 
issues, even if we are loath to approach them elsewhere in the 
curriculum. Failure to address the highly charged emotional is-
sues of law practice within skills-training courses runs the risk of 
making such courses an edl,lcational travesty . 
. 

